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COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIMES:
AN ANALYSIS
Spurred by the implementation of plans in Great Britain,' New
Zealand, 2 and California; 3 and by various other federal4 and state5 pro-
posals, the concept of state compensation to victims of violent crimes
has recently become the subject of wide public interest and intensive
legal debate.6 In essence, the concept envisages some scheme by which
the victims of crimes of violence can be compensated for any losses
resulting from their criminally inflicted injuries. 7
Before any proposals based on this conception are adopted they
should be shown to have a valid theoretical framework, supported by
sound legal principles, with an effective and efficient system of ad-
ministration. The purpose of this note is to examine existing plans and
proposals to determine whether they possess these essential characteristics.
On this basis a discussion of compensation embraces three central areas
of concern: (1) the various rationales proposed as a basis for a com-
pensation scheme; (2) legal analogies and precedents to which such a
1. The British non-statutory scheme was announced in Home Office, Compensation
for Victims of Violence, CmNlD. No. 2323 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Cnmd. No. 2323).
2. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1963, 1 NEW ZE.AD STAT. No. 134 (1963).
3. CaL,. STAT. CH. 1549 (1965).
4. Various federal proposals have been introduced. All of the proposals except that
of Rep. Green, H.R. 11818, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. (1965), are based on the bill
introduced by Sen. Yarborough, S. 2155 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965) (hereinafter cited
as S. 2155), which proposes a compensation scheme which encompasses only the limited
areas of general federal police power and responsibility. Specifically, the "special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States:' (18 US.C. Sect. 7 (1964)),
and the District of Columbia. This plan is sought to serve as a model for state com-
pensation schemes. The bill introduced by Rep. Green, however, proposes a plan
for national compensation of the federal level.
5. States in which compensation proposals have been introduced are: Oregon (H.
1822, 1965), Wisconsin (S. 450, 1965) and Maryland (S. 151, 1966.)
6. The concept of compensation is not a new one; it can be traced from the Code
of Hamurabi, up through modem legal systems. See generally, HARPER, Tim CODE OF
HAmuRABI 19 (1904) Sections 23 & 24; and the proposals of the Italian criminologists
Garfolo and Ferri, GARFoO, CRIMINOLOGY 413 (1914); FERRI, CRImnAL SocIoLOGY,
1152 (1927). See also the suggestions of British social philosopher Jeremy Bentham,
1 BEN T M, WoaRs 372 (Browning ed. 1947). Compensation was first given serious
thought in England by the leading social reformer and magistrate Margery Fry. See
Fry, Justice for Victims, The Observer (London) July 7, 1957.
7. See generally, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table.
8 J. Pur. L. 191; and Compensation to Victims of Crimes of Personal Violence: An
Examination of the Scope of the Problem, 50 MINN. L. Rxv. 212 (1965).
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plan can be related; and (3) the practical difficulties involved in im-
plementing a compensation plan. Although certain aspects of compen-
sation have been discussed in depth elsewhere, it is hoped that a more
complete discussion which centers on this three-part analysis will
provide a new direction to subsequent analysis.8
THEORETICAL RATIONALES FOR COMPENSATION
The basis for all the compensation proposals rests on the clear distinc-
tion that our modern legal system has created between civil and criminal
remedies. Almost all serious crimes are simultaneously torts, and no
civil act or omission is suspended because such act amounts similarly
to a criminal offense. However, the law has left it to the victim to
take appropriate action against the offender to recover what he can.
The central problem here is that the offender, assuming that he can
be identified and discovered, is rarely worth suing because he is likely
to be financially irresponsible.9
Based on the premise that the present civil remedy is wholly inade-
quate, compensation proposals have relied on various rationales with
which to support their scheme.'" Primary among these are those ad-
vocating reparation by the offender through a system of penal reform,"
state compensation based on social fault theory,12 and state compensa-
tion on the basis of controlling social policy. 3
The inadequacy of present tort law to protect the victim of crime
8. Several outstanding articles have been published in recent months dealing with
various aspects of compensation. Among these are: Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal
to Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10 ST. Louis L. Rv. 247 (1965); Compensation
To Victims of Crimes of Personal Violence: An Examination of the Scope of the
Problem, 50 MINN. L. REv. 212 (1965); Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted
Personal Injuries, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 444 (1964); Note, Compensation for Victims of
Crime, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 531 (1966); Note, Compensation for Victims of Violent
Crimes, 61 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 72 (1966). All of these, however, by the very nature of
their intensive analysis of specific aspects of the problem have failed to present the
concept of compensation in its entirety. It would seem appropriate, therefore, to present
a more encompassing analysis in order to make subsequent judgments more accurate.
9. Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime, The New Zealand Experiment,
12 J. PUB. L. 368 (1963).
10. See generally, Note, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 531
(1966) for a more extensive discussion of these various alternatives.
11. See generally, Silving, Compensation of Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round
Table, 8 J. PuB. L. 236 (1959).
12. Fry, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J.
PuB. L. 191 (1959).
13. Supra note 10.
[Vol. 8:277
COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS
has led to the suggestion that penal systems should be oriented not on
a policy of deterrence and retribution to the offender; but rather on
enforcing the victim's claim for restitution by integrating compensation
as a part of the offender's punishment.' 4 Instituting such a plan under
the present penal system, however, would seem to be an evasion rather
than a solution to the problem, and one would still be confronted with
the financial irresponsibility of the criminal class.15 Therefore, most
of the proposals go beyond simply advocating state intervention to
require restitution by the offender, and suggest establishing a fund from
the proceeds of prison labor which could be used to compensate the
victims of violent crimes.16
In the majority of cases, however, any such scheme would not pro-
vide adequate compensation for the injured victim.' 7 Furthermore, any
plan which proposed incarceration of offenders until restitution from
their prison labor had been achieved could be justly criticized on several
significant grounds. Under such a system, criminal responsibility would
attach, at least in some measure, to the amount of damage done which
might not coincide with the mens rea.18 Secondly, these solutions, in a
final analysis, would amount to imprisonment for debt. 9
Therefore, although restitution proposals, placing as they do primary
responsibility on the offender (who ought in terms of justice to be
charged with it), deserve close and careful scrutiny. Any logically
sound rationale for victim compensation must, by default, be based
on some form of state compensation.
Having failed to justify compensation to victims from the efforts of
the criminal class who bear the primary responsibility, various proposals
have been presented which stress the duty of the state to protect its
citizens and its collateral obligation to indemnify those citizens when
it fails in this duty.2° This argument centers on the premise that the
state, which forbids its citizens to arm themselves in self-defense, cannot
14. Shafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Modernized,
50 MINN. L. REv. 243 (1965).
15. Supra note 10, at 535.
16. Miller, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J.
PUB. L. 208 (1959). See also, Georgio Del Vecchio, The Problem of Penal Justice
(Imprisonment of Reparation of Damage) 27 REVISTA JUCIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE
P ERTO Rico (Silving trans. 1959).
17. See British Working Party White Paper, Compensation for Victims of Violence,
C.iND. No. 1406 (1961).
18. Silving, supra note 10, at 245.
19. Ibid.
20. Goldberg, Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 205, 224 (1964).
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disown all responsibility for its failure to protect them.2 1 In addition.
advocates of state liability rely on the lack of response from society
to the causes of crime. 22 If society continues to tolerate recognized
sources of criminal emergence, it is argued that certainly it has some
minimum responsibility to the victims of such criminal violence. 23
This rationale, however, is plagued with fundamental difficulties and
has not, therefore, been accorded general recognition. The principal
difficulty stems from the dubious premise which places liability on one
for the wrongful conduct of another.2 4 Furthermore, it is doubtful
whether the state does in fact guarantee absolute protection to its
citizens. 25 Many crimes are outside the state's powers of prevention.2 6
Consequently, although our traditional doctrines of vicarious liability
have been extended to encompass broader and broader areas,2 7 liability
has not yet been extended to such a degree as to permit justification for
placing primary responsibility for compensation to victims of violent
crime upon the state. Thus, the majority of proposals advocating com-
pensation, have chosen rather to base their discussion on an expansion
of social welfare on behalf of the victim as a logical extension of existing
welfare programs.
Although the arguments based on society's failure to protect the in-
dividual, and its toleration of acknowledged sources of crime are not
sufficient to support a finding that society has a duty to compensate
the victim of crime, nonetheless, they are persuasive in support of a
rationale based on social welfare.
21. Fry, supra note 12 at 192. See also comments by Senator Yarborough upon intro-
ducing his bill in Congress: "Having encouraged our people to go out into the streets
unprotected, we cannot deny that this puts a special obligation upon us to see that these
people are, in fact, protected from the consequences of crime." ill Cong. Rec. 13533
(daily ed. June 17, 1965).
22. See Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 444, at 456 (1964).
23. Ibid.
24. Supra note 10, at 537.
25. See British White Paper, CMND. No. 1406, at p. 7. "There is a distinction betveen
compensation for the consequences of civil riot, which the forces of law and order
may be expected to prevent, and compensation for individual acts of personal violence
which can never be entirely prevented ... it does not follow that the state has assured
the duty of (protection) .... everywhere .... the most it has done is to create an
assumption that it will provide a general condition of civil peace."; supra note 10, at
537.
26. Supra note 10, at 537.
27. Particularly in the area of workmen's compensation and products liability. See
Generally Miller, supra note 16.
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At a time when society has admitted its responsibility for the costs
of industrial accidents, old age illness, and injured veterans, there is a
persuasive argument that compensation costs should be distributed
among the potential victims, society at large.2 8 The concept of risk-
sharing in order to spread the cost throughout the entire group becomes
even more compelling when, as it has been noted, many victims cannot
afford private insurance.29 This type of argument, to be sure, is subject
to the criticism that such a program leads to abandonment of individual
responsibility and to dependence on governmental paternalism. 0 Further,
it must be noted that under such a risk-spreading scheme, not all of the
group run the same risk of criminal violence as do others and, therefore.
compensation would amount in some degree to a redistribution of the
costs of criminal violence from groups which now bear a proportionately
larger amount to those with a lighter load.31
In spite of such criticism, social legislation appears to be the strongest
rationale supporting compensation to victims of violent crime.32 In fact,
the majority of the proposals go so far as to provide for the compen-
sation not as a matter of right but "ex gratia". This, of course, makes
the compensation award discretionary, and forecloses any question of
judicial review.33
EXISTING LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
Following a discussion of the theoretical rationale behind compen-
sation lies the issue of whether the sincere impulse to compensate the
unfortunate crime victim which is reflected in the proposals for social
legislation can find adequate legal support through historical relation-
ships and analogous legal precedents.34 What criteria can be employed
to justify the compensation of victims of crime through social legisla-
28. Schultz, The Violated: A Proposal to Compensate Victims of Violent Crime, 10
ST. Louis L. REv. 247 (1965).
29. Childres, supra note 22, at 457.
30. Inbau, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J.
PuB. 202 (1959).
31. This result obtains because crime rates vary greatly between various cultural,
racial and economic groups. Supra note 10, at 539.
32. See CMND. No. 1406 at 7-8, Yarborough S.B. 2155 of the Eighty-Ninth Congress-
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, 50 MIN. L. Rav. 255 at 256 & 257 (1965).
33. CmrNw. No. 2323 at 4; Yarborough, supra note 31, at 256; supra note 10, at 542.
34. See generally Note, Compensation for Victims of Violent Crime, 61 Nw. U. L.
Rav. 72 at 75 (1966).
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tion rather than any other group of equally innocent victims of mis-
fortune? 5
There are several analogies to which the concept of compensation
can be effectively related. First among these is the historical position
of the victim of violent crime which placed emphasis on reparation by
the offender and his social unit to the victim instead of society in the
aggregate3 6 The next analogy deals with that variety of situations
in which our system has moved away from the concept of common
law fault and has placed liability on certain classes regardless of fault;
or on classes who caused the harm, but were not necessarily at fault in
so doing. Primary among these are legislation establishing workmen's
compensation 7 and the expanding field of products liability and extra-
hazardous activities.38
The basis of primitive criminal law was the personal reparation by
the offender to the victim.39 In primitive legal systems, private conduct
which would be criminal today would probably have been constituted
a tort and have been compensable by payment of damages to the victim. 40
Only those acts which threatened the stability of the entire society
were considered of sufficient seriousness to entail public prosecution.
Private disputes remained outside the concern of public censure and
were not for the most part considered public crimes.41 This is not to
say, however, that the private disputes were ignored. Rather primitive
society provided for an organized system of victim revenge, generally
consisting of compensation to the victim.4 2 In this regard, only the
victim gained and the state acquired nothing except order and control
by insisting on compensation of the victim.4 3 Here compensation was
generally guaranteed by the offender's family unit and the only problems
were those involving indigent offenders not connected with any house-
35. Miller, supra note 16, at 204.
36. See generally, supra note 34, at 76 et. seq.
37. Id. at 84 et seq.
38. Miller, supra note 16, at 205.
39. CMmN. No. 1406, supra note 25.
40. Mueller, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table, 8 J.
PuB. L. 218, at 233; Mueller, Tort Crime and the Primitive, 46 J. CRIM. L. C.&P.S. 312
(1965).
41. Ibid.; See also 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 48 (2nd ed.
1885); PLucKETT, A CONCIsE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 426 (5th ed. 1956).
42. Mueller, supra note 40, at 313.
43. Mueller, supra note 40, at 225.
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hold.44 There were set schedules of damages for specific offenses and
most of the punitive damages were pecuniary.45
Similarly, to the primitive societies, the legal institutions of early
western culture were based on an indemnification from the offender's
family to the victim. 46 The Anglo-Saxon legal system evolved from the
blood feud between family groups to a stable system by which money
payments were set at commutations for injury.47 During the feudal
period, an elaborate system of compensation was also established. 48
Thus the primary emphasis of the retribution for personal offenses
involving violence was centered upon the individual victim. 49 The ad-
vent of modern legal systems, however, saw the subordination of the in-
dividual's claim. The state's right to punish was substituted for the right
of the injured victim to recover damages for his loss.5° This change has
had a dual effect. First, "punishment has been separated from indemni-
fication" with criminal law emerging as a separate field;5 secondly, the
state has assumed total control over the enforcement of legal sanctions
administered at the family level.5 2 Thus, the interests of the state or
sovereign in punishing private offenses gained superiority over the in-
dividual victim, with his only private redress being a civil tort action.5
Therefore, the victim, who historically enjoyed the position of primary
concern in retribution of criminal violence, has been required to assume
44. Id. at 225.
45. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MlIN,-. L. REv.
222 at 224 (1965).
46. Id. at 224.
47. POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, Timi HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I (2d ed. 1923).
48. The offender could, "buy back the peace that he had broken" by paying bot
to the victim or his family group through a schedule of injury tariffs. Most private
offenses were "emendable" by such payment coupled with a requirement to pay
simultaneously an additional amount, the wvite, to the King. 2 PoLLoca AND MAITLAND,
supra note 47, at 451-452.
49. Supra note 34, at 179.
50. Silving, supra note 11, at 236.
51. Id. at 237.
52. Id. at 237.
53. This transformation whereby the individual was replaced by the sovereign in
redressing private wrongs occurred in England through a dual process: (1) The king
arbitrarily assumed jurisdiction over a greater number of offenses, by extending pro-
tection to various persons and places and during various times; (2) The original concept
of "felony" which was restricted in feudal times to a breach of the -feudal relationship
was expanded to include numerous other serious non-public offenses. Felony thus came
to encompass, murder, mayhem, rape, arson, robbery, larceny and burglary. 2 POLLOCK
AND MAITLAND, supra note 44, at 450-470; supra note 34, at 80-81.
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a secondary role in the process of restitution of wrongs in the interests
of peace, stability, and social growth. Because it has been the state
which has pre-empted this historic position, logically, the state should
on the basis of social legislation support the interest of the injured victim.
To be sure the victim's interest is recognized in a private civil recovery.
However, where such redress is demonstrated to be inadequate in order
to return the victim to his historic position, the state should provide
compensation for his losses.
In addition to reliance on a historical relationship to justify placing
compensation in the area of social legislation, advocates have relied on
supporting legal analogies; the primary one being Workmen's Com-
pensation which represents the outstanding departure from the individ-
ualistic concept of personal fault to a system of non-fault liability.54 The
moving purpose behind the workmen's compensation legislation was to
distribute the risk of accidental injury from the worker who could least
afford to support it, and to re-distribute this risk throughout the entire
industry as a cost of production, with the ultimate expense running in
increased prices to the consumer.55 The basic justification for the
workmen's compensation plans is that since the employer benefits
economically through increased profits in the labor of the employee,
the employee should not be forced to bear the cost of an injury sustained
in the course of contributing said labor.56 Behind even this, however,
rests the central premise of risk-spreading; that is, the optimum method
of bearing a loss in a group is to assess it on those members of the group
best able to distribute it. 57 There are certain identifiable characteristics
peculiar to workmen's compensation: 58 (1) the potential victims are a
large but assessable group, (2) there is a nexus between the potential
victims as a group and the industrial employees who would have to bear
the loss, and (3) workmen's compensation legislation abrogated the
concept of fault and placed the basis of the legislation rather on the re-
lation or nexus between the two groups.5 9
There is a sufficient parallel between the group of potential victims
of industrial accidents and the group of potential victims of crime both
large and identifiable. Further, as it has been noted above, the concept
54. Miller, supra note 16, at 205; supra note 34, at 84.
55. 1 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation 2 (3rd ed. 1941).
56. Id. at 3-4.
57. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805 (1930); supra note 34, at 85.
58. Miller, supra note 16, at 205.
59. Ibid.
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of risk-spreading which formed the basic premise for workmen's com-
pensation can readily be related to compensation of victims of crime.6
The analogy, however, finds its weakest point when an attempt is made
to parallel the relation between the group who suffers the loss and the
group to whom the risk must be distributed. Presumably since the loss
cannot be shifted on the victim himself, proposals envisage shifting it
to the public as a whole. No comparable relation exists, however,
between the public as a whole and the victim of crime. It cannot be said
that the state profits from the efforts of the victim in any significant
sense. Since workmen's compensation finds its basis on this relation
between employee and employer, it is here that the analogy to com-
pensation finds its weakest support.6 Instead, victim compensation must
rely on the general proposition that crime losses are endemic to the
entire society and that endemic losses should be spread throughout the
entire group.62
The second major area in which absolute liability has replaced the
laissez-faire system of personal fault is in the field of products liability.
Here again the evolution can be traced from the early decisions denying
recovery to a remote purchaser against the manufacturer even when
the manufacturer was at fault.63 This situation was of course substantially
altered in the United States in the case of McPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.64 which extended the liability of the manufacturer to the consumer,
resting not upon the contract, but on the relation arising from the
purchase and the forseeability of harm if proper care were not used.
5
From this point society has moved even farther, by permitting recovery
in warranty without privity, toward imposing liability without fault
upon the manufacturer, basing such liability on the relation that exists
between manufacturer and consumer.66 Here again we find the same
60. Childres, supra note 22, at 457.
61. Supra note 34, at 86-87.
62. Id. at 457.
63. The Courts began by developing various exceptions which modified the general
rule expressed first in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M&vV 109 (1842). The first such
exception was that if the seller knew that the chattel was dangerous and did not
disclose that fact he would be held liable; Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 44 Minn. 333,
51 N.W. 1103 (1892). The second exception from non-liability involved the use of the
chattel on defendant's premises; Coughtry v. Globe Wooden Co., 56 N.Y. 124, 15 Am.
St. Rep. 337 (1874). The third and most important exception held the seller liable for
any article inherently dangerous to human safety, Hubet v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co., 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
64. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
65. Ibid.
66. "The device used to accomplish this result was the extension of the strict
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nexus between the group of potential victims, the consumer, and the
group of loss-bearers who stand to profit from the system, the manu-
facturers. Once more there is a supporting analogy between the large
and identifiable group of victims of products defects, and the large and
identifiable group of victims of violent crime. However, as in the case of
workmen's compensation the analogy fails in finding an adequate rela-
tionship between the victims of crime and the loss bearers, i.e. the general
public.
A similar analogy can be traced in the area of absolute tort liability for
extra-hazardous activities. The rule established in Rylands v. Fletcher67
held that one who undertakes an activity which is likely to result in
risk of harm, even if done with the utmost care, is strictly liable without
fault for the harm that it causes. 8 The basis for these and other areas
of liability without fault 9 is that the party who ultimately causes the
injury can most easily bear the risk of paying for it.
Obviously, these analogies cannot be stretched too far because of the
lack of a satisfactory relationship between the state and the victim.
They are, however, valuable in demonstrating the concept of risk distri-
bution, and in emphasizing the expansion of the concept of strict liability
as a replacement for the laissez-faire concept of individual fault. This
indicates a prevailing climate for the further extension of such plans
into other areas where the innocent victims of misfortune are inadequate-
ly recompensed by the present system for their losses.
PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN EFFECTIVELY ESTABLISHING AN EFFICIENT
AND FAIR PROGRAM OF COMPENSATION
The greatest amount of criticism of proposals to compensate victims
of violent crime has centered around the practical difficulties in estab-
lishing such a program and effectively integrating it in the existing
system of criminal administration. Of particular concern has been the
danger of fraudulent or unjustified claims, the practical cost of any
such scheme, the problem of determining which crimes should be con-
liability of implied warranty beyond the immediate buyer to the ultimate consumer ....
nearly a third of the American jurisdictions have broken away from the requirement
of privity of contract," and have found some way to extend strict liability to the
consumer." PROssaR, LAw OF TORTS, 2Nm ED. (1955) at p. 507.
67. Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1866).
68. Ibid.; Prosser, supra note 66 at 329.
69. Other areas in which strict liability has been extended are: The Federal Safety
Appliance Act (45 USCA Section 1 and ff.); Child Labor Statutes; and Pure Food Acts,
Prosser, supra note 66 at 337.
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pensated and by how much, and finally the difficulty in integrating any
such proposal with the present administration of criminal justice.
Of primary concern in any scheme of victim compensation is pro-
tecting the public from fraudulent claims. Most of the proposals have
attempted to surmount this difficulty by arbitrarily excluding all but
crimes of violence against the person from consideration. Crimes against
property it is felt would prove highly susceptible to fraud;70 whereas
"few people would voluntarily wound themselves to obtain a modest
compensation and (therefore) the risk of successful deception is negli-
gible." -11 Granting this premise in the majority of cases;72 there still
exists the problem of the culpable victim. The victim who is either
partially or wholly responsible for his injury because of previous pro-
voking conduct presents a serious problem.73 The two areas in which
there is the highest incidence of victim precipitation in violent crimes
are sex offenses,74 and family or domestic arguments followed by physical
violence. 75 In these types of cases the line between victim and offender
is impossible to draw, and the solution to these difficulties does not seem
readily apparent.
In the case of fraudulent claims, if compensation is based solely on
a criminal conviction, then many bona fide victims will be denied com-
pensation 76 as well as causing an unreasonable delay at the time when
the financial remuneration is most needed. Lowering the burden of
proof would seem to be the best solution, and most of the plans have
adopted the civil "preponderance of the evidence," in place of the crimi-
nal "beyond a reasonable doubt." 7' In fact, only the California plan in-
70. Fry, supra note 12 at 193.
71. Ibid.
72. It should be noted that particularly in the area of sex offenses, deception would
be a relatively simple matter, and detection would prove practically impossible. See
generally, Weihofen, Compensation for Victims of Criminal Violence: A Round Table,
8 J. PUB. L. 209 at 210 et seq. (1959).
73. Studies have indicated that 25% of all violent crime is victim precipitated, Wolf-
gang, Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicides, 48 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 1 (1957).
74. "Psychological investigations demonstrate that with victims of rape or seduction
a significant number actually consented, and another appreciable number engaged in
reckless or flagrantly provocative conduct," Weihofen, supra note 72 at 212.
75. A high percentage of all murders arise out of family quarrels. "A study of 1,000
murders committed in New Jersey revealed that 67% of them arose out of unpremedi-
tated quarrels-with wives, mistresses, sex rivals, or acquaintances." WEHOFEN, THE
URGE TO PUNISH, 158 (1956).
76. Ibid. In 1957 of the 3 million violent criminal offenses committed, only one-third
resulted in charges of which only 69% resulted in convictions.
77. NEW ZEALAND STAT. No. 134 at Section 17(5) (recovery based "on a balance of
probabilities."); S. 2155 at Section 301(o) (Claim supported by substantial evidence").
19671
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEV [ 8
corporated a criminal conviction as a requirement for compensation.78
However some substitute would seem necessary. 79 The British plan
provides that the reported offense must be related immediately to the
police in order to be eligible for compensation, unless it was the subject
of some criminal proceeding; however the New Zealand statute and
the federal proposal omit any such requirement.8 0
Most of the plans have attempted to solve the problem of victim
participation at least in part by either wholly excluding or limiting
recovery by the offender's relatives or household members. 8' The British
plan provides further that compensation should be paid only for "un-
provoked assaults upon innocent persons." 82 The federal proposal and
the New Zealand statute have adopted the exclusionary standard, ex-
cluding from contribution all victims who contributed directly or in-
directly to their injuries. 83 This has been criticized as being unnecessarily
limited and the broader British proposal which excludes all those "re-
sponsible" for their injuries may be preferable on that basis.84
Whether these measures will prove sufficient to reduce compensation
awards based on fraudulent or victim-precipitated claims to an accept-
able minimum remains to be seen. In reality even though all the plans
attempt in some measure to exclude the culpable victim, they all place
the majority of responsibility for determining the validity of claims on
an administrative commission established for that purpose. This would
seem to be a dubious solution at best, and further plans should focus more
specific attention on fraudulent claims by making eligibility for com-
78. CAL STAT. CH. 1549 (1965).
79. CAL STAT. cai. 1549 (1965). The Yarborough bill accepts proof of final conviction
of a crime as conclusive that the offense was committed. S. 2155 section 205(i).
80. CMND. No. 2323 1944 at Paragraph 5d.; see generally N.Z. STAT. No. 134; and
S. 2155.
81. The British and Federal proposals deny compensation altogether to this class.
See CMND. No. 2323 at Paragraph 7, and S. 2155 Section 304(c). "No compensation shall
be awarded if the victim-
(1) is a relation of the offender; or
(2) was at the time of the personal injury or death of the victim living
with the offender as his wife or her husband or as a member of the
offender's household.
The New Zealand proposal, on the other hand, only prevents victims related to or living
with the offender from receiving compensation for pain and suffering, but allows
them to recover for their actual losses sustained. NEw ZEALAND STAT. No. 134 at Sec-
tion 18(2).
82. CMND. No. 1406 at 11.
83. N.Z. STAT. No. 134 Section 17(3); S. 2155 Section 301(d).
84. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injuries, 50 MINN. L.
REv. 271 at 274 (1965).
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pensation depend on a report by the victim to the police within a short
period after the injury; followed by the submission of a medical report.8 5
Concern has been voiced by critics of the compensation schemes as to
the projected cost of such proposals. It has been argued in this regard
that any equitable compensation plan would have to cover the total
amount of the loss through crime in addition to the cost of administering
the compensation scheme. Since the annual cost of crime is about 7%
of the national income (over $20,000,000 in 1957),81 this would ob-
viously prove to be prohibitive. This estimate, however, seems sig-
nificantly inflated. In the first place, the cost of law enforcement and
judicial administration is already being borne by society; therefore, the
only addition would be the cost of the total amount of harm caused by
crime, and the expense of the administrative framework.8 7 Further, the
examples of the expenditures of existing plans to date demonstrate that
the cost of such proposals should be much more reasonable. In its first
eleven months of operation, the British plan gave grants totalling
$232,234.80,88 whereas New Zealand only paid out $4,888 in eighteen
monthss 9 These experiences should be ample evidence that the cost of
such proposals will not prove to be prohibitive.
As it has been noted above, all the compensation proposals limit the
scheme to compensation of victims of crimes of personal injury. Such
arbitrary exclusion of crimes of property can be justified on the grounds
that: (1) fraudulent claims of property loss would be practically im-
possible to detect, (2) property is more likely to be covered by private
insurance,90 (3) property loss is never quite as disastrous as serious
injury to the person, and (4) a program for compensation which in-
cluded property damage would greatly increase the expense.91 The
basic reason for the distinction, however, probably lies in the fact that
public sympathy runs much greater toward a victim of violent crime
than to one who has suffered property loss, and the drafters of the
proposals are intent on securing wide public support.
Granting, therefore, that the reasons for the distinction are well
85. Id. at 282.
86. 12 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENr, TE CosT oF
CIu.E (1931); Mueller, supra note 40 at 219.
87. Mueller, supra note 40 at 219.
88. Worsnep, Compensation for Victims of Crime, 11 Editorial Research Reports 685
at 691 (1965).
89. Id. at 689.
90. Starrs, Private Insurance for Victims of Crime, 50 MiNN. L. REv. 285 (1965).
91. See generally on the exclusion of property loss, Childres, supra note 84 at 272.
19671
290 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:277
founded, nonetheless, the arbitrary separation can be criticized on prac-
tical grounds. The primary difficulty is that such a distinction is not
very often possible to draw.9 2 The British plan has attempted to solve
this problem by requiring that the injury be attributable to a criminal
offense involving the use of force.93 The New Zealand statute and the
federal bill, on the other hand, provide for an elaborate schedule of
enumerated offenses. In order for a victim to be eligible for compensa-
tion, his injury must have been caused by a crime falling within this
schedule.94 This latter procedure would seem to compound rather than
alleviate the difficulty of distinguishing crimes of violence against the
person from crimes of property. Even if, and it is doubtful, one is able to
enumerate specifically all the crimes from which injury may result, in
those instances where the distinction is difficult to draw, any plan, such
as the British proposal, which leaves considerable discretion to the ad-
ministrative agency would be preferable.
All the plans allow recovery by the victim whether or not it has been
judicially determined that a crime has, in fact, been committed. Conse-
quently, compensation does not depend upon whether the criminal has
been apprehended. Nor does a lack of capacity to form criminal intent
bar recovery. 95
The amount of compensation to the victim is another area of poten-
tial difficulty. Strong arguments have been advanced against compensa-
tion on the level of common law damages.96 The most preferable
solution would be a compensation pattern resembling workmen's com-
pensation or social welfare programs. Existing plans, however, have
generally incorporated the common law pattern. The federal bill allows
recovery for expenses actually incurred as a result of the injury, loss of
earning power and pain and suffering, but with a ceiling of $25,000. 97
The British and New Zealand plans also adopt the common law elements
of damage but place ceilings on recovery for loss of earnings.98
92. "What about armed robbery, burglary or arson? They may involve threatened
or even actual violence yet are open to the same difficulties as other crimes of property."
Weihofen, supra note 72 at 210.
93. CminD. No. 2323 at 5.
94. N.Z. STAT. No. 134 Schedule; S. 2155 Section 302.
95. N.Z. STAT. No. 134 Section 17(b); S. 2155 Section 301(f); CMNO. No. 2323 at 5.
96. Childres, supra note 22, at 462. Childres' argument against common law damages
is based on the following points: (1) common law damages would not be limited to
compensation; (2) common law damages would have no ceiling; (3) delay is unsatis-
factory; (4) common law damages would add needless expense.
97. S. 2155 Section 303 and 304(b).
98. ,CMND. No. 2323 at 6; N.Z. STAT. No. 134 Section 19(3).
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A final area to which attention must be focused is the prevention of
multiple recovery. The concept of compensation is, of course, com-
pensatory. The victim should be placed as near as possible in the same
position as he was prior to the injury. For this reason the amount of
compensation which the victim receives from other sources, whether
private insurance or workmen's compensation, etc., should be deducted
from his award. Under most of the existing proposals, provision had been
made for the deduction of these additional public payments. 9
Most of the proposals for compensation envisage the creation of an
independent administrative agency, 00 or the attachment of the program
with an existing agency.'' The central advantage in such a concept is
that claims can be speedily processed and awards made without undue
delay. The federal bill requires a hearing at which the compensation
claim will be litigated. Both victim and agency would be represented
by counsel, introduce evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. 02 The
British and New Zealand plans perhaps provide for a speedier decision
by having the victim submit an application for compensation to one
member of the compensation commission. The commission then investi-
gates the claim and either makes an award or rejects the application. If
the victim is dissatisfied with the decision, he can appeal for a hearing
before the entire commission at which time he can present his case."0 3
Without doubt, the commission would be required to employ investi-
gators to process these claims. Such investigation could be maintained
at a moderate level if, as suggested above, the plans provided for a
timely police report and medical examination. Administration of a com-
pensation plan, therefore, would not seem to present any significant
difficulty and the cost of such an agency could probably be kept within
reasonable bounds.
The problem of greatest concern which has been raised in establishing
a viable scheme for victim compensation is that of integration with the
existing administration of criminal justice.0 4 As has been noted above,
99. N.Z. Star. No. 134 Section 17(b), (c), (d); S. 2155 Section 305(b); CMaD. No.
2323 at 7.
100. A three member board has been considered optimum by the proposed Federal
commission and the New Zealand Tribunal, S. 2155 Sect. 201(a); N.Z. STAT. No. 134
Sect. 4. The British plan, on the other hand, has established a five man board. CMND.
No. 2323 at 4.
101. California has integrated its compensation plan with the State Dept. of Social
Welfare, CAL. WELFARE & INsnTTuToNs CODE SEcrIoN 11211.
102. S. 2155 Section 205.
103. CMND. No. 2323 at 7; New Zealand follows the British procedure.
104. Supra note 34, at 101.
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the majority of the proposals specifically omit any requirement that
compensation be based on conviction in a criminal trial." 5 As a conse-
quence, the situation may well arise where an issue of significant im-
portance to the accused at his trial is decided previously at the compen-
sation hearing. Since the compensation proceedings are administrative,
and since they do not employ the same rules of evidence or burden of
proof; it is conceivable that such decision could prove unjustifiably
prejudicial to the defendant's case.' If, for example, the accused bases
his case on the fact that the victim was a culpable actor in the crime,
what are his chances of success if the jury is made aware that the victim
has received a compensation award?107 On the other hand, the denial
of an award to the victim would conceivably prejudice the state's case.'
A further consideration would be the reluctance of the compensated
victim to testify at the criminal trial, especially in those instances where
the offender might have assisted in his recovery.1 9
The New Zealand statute and the federal proposals have attempted
to solve the problem in part by providing for a postponement of the
compensation hearing if a criminal proceeding is pending." 0 This would
not seem to be an adequate solution, however, because in that case the
victim could hardly be expected to give objective testimony in those
instances where award would be contingent upon conviction.
The sole solution would seem to be that the proceedings at the com-
pensation hearing should be made inadmissable in court and knowledge
of such outcome by any juror should be sufficient to dismiss him for
cause. To insure adequate protection of the accused, such a safeguard
should be a mandatory section of all compensation proposals.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has been designed to point out the separate
considerations which are involved in a discussion of compensation. Al-
though other legal articles have discussed the various aspects of com-
pensation in greater depth than has been analyzed here, they have all
failed to make this essential distinction between the theoretical and legal
supportive principles and the practical problems involved in any com-
105. Only California has such a stipulation. CAL. STAT. CH. 1549.
106. Supra note 34, at 101.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Inbau, supra note 30, at 203.
110. N.Z. STAT. No. 134 at Section 17(b); S. 2155 Section 301(f).
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pensation plan. By separating the analysis into three separate and inde-
pendent considerations it has been possible to indicate that while the
theoretical bases for the proposals are strong, the practical problems
remain largely unsolved. It is thus feasible to support the general con-
cept of compensation while rejecting any further implementation of
compensation proposals at this time. As has been indicated, existing
plans have not, for the most part found adequate solutions to the difficult
task of operating a compensation plan effectively and fairly. A sheme
of this importance and with a controversial basis should not, regardless
of its persuasive supporting principles, be attempted until better solu-
tions to these problems are produced. Unfortunately those who have
criticized compensation proposals have indiscriminately included in their
criticisms disapproval of the theoretical basis with doubt over practical
feasibility. On the other hand, advocates of compensation have tended
to ignore practical difficulties and to rationalize these problems on the
basis of the theoretical soundness of their position. Both these positions
are unsatisfactory. By separating the analysis one can settle conclusively
the issue of whether or not the plans are theoretically desirable. Thus
resolved, discussion in the future can center on the practical problems
and their solutions.
Because compensation plans evoke widespread sympathy for the
victim, and do not infringe on established pressure groups, they will
probably receive substantial support in many states in the future. The
danger of such proposals as has been demonstrated lies in the fact that
that this moral persuasiveness and substantial legal analogies will override
the difficulties which remain with practical implementation. Granting
that a legitimate rationale and a substantial legal basis are strong evidence
for the theoretical advisability of a compensation plan, nonetheless, be-
fore any further schemes are given effect, some adequate alteinatives
should be advanced which will permit the plan to operate effectively
within the framework of our present judicial system.
Robert E. Scott
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